

EXHIBIT NO. 142

MATERIAL RELATING TO "WINDS" CODE

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From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 19 November 1941
 Circular #2353

1 (a)

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

- (1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.¹
- (2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KIT. NOKAZE KUMORI²
- (3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.³

¹ East wind rain.

² North wind cloudy.

³ West wind clear.

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

25432 JD-1: 6875

I (b)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
Circular #2354

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".

(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.); "NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

25392 JD-1: 6850

[1]

1 (c)

Top Secret

28 November 1941

From: CINCAF

Action: OPNAV

Info: COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN 281430

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Signapore X If diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi no Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi no Kaze hare X Unquote X British and COMSIXTEEN monitoring above broadcasts

1 (d)

Telegram Received

BF. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

----- Batavia
From: Dated December 4, 1941
Rec'd. 9:19 a. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

220, December 4, 10 a. m.

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo:

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers."

Same re following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:

"When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita North Russia, three Nishi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies."

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

FOOTE.

HSM

From: ALUSNA BATAVIA
Date: 5 DEC 1941
Decoded by: KALAJDJIAN
Paraphrased by: PURDY
Ø31Ø3Ø CRØ222

1 (e)
OPNAV RRRRR

From Thorpe for miles War Dept. Code intercept:—Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain XXXXXX United States; north wind cloudy Russia; west wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

(Signature illegible)

Distribution:

War. Dept. Action Files: CNO 2ØØP 2ØA Record Copy: 2ØC X Show
OPDO Top Secret

Secret.

Naval Message
Message
From OPNAV

2 (a)
Navy Department
Precedence: Priority XXXX

Released by: L. F. Safford - Com 14
Com 16

Date
TOR CODE ROOM: 2548
CINCAF
CINCPAC
282301

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

New Tokyo broadcast schedules as follows X Jig victor jig one two two seven five kc six pm and seven pm to Pacific Coast six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X Jig hypo love five one six zero kc eight pm nine pm and ten pm to China coast X Jig unit option nine four three zero kc six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X Jig hypo prep'one one nine eight zero kc ten thirty pm to Europe X Probably Tokyo time.

Top Secret—Ultra
Secret

2 (b)
Top secret

1 December 1941
From:
Action: CINCAF
Info: CINCPAC, OPNAV, COMFOURTEEN
Ø11422

Jig victor jig press tonight in closing seventeen hundred schedule stated quote "All listeners be sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero seven thirty tomorrow morning, since thebe may be important news" unquote XX Suggest frequencies seven three two seven X nine four three zero X and one two two seven five X times Tokyo lct.

Sent No. 519, 12/5

2 (c)
Secret

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES.

Top Secret

Secret

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JWV3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JWV3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

[SEAL]

T. J. SLOWIE,
Secretary.

Top Secret

3 (a)

DOCUMENT No. 1

GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROADCAST

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

3 (b)

Secret

DOCUMENT No. 2

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

Weather message from station JWV3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.

3 (c)
Secret

DOCUMENT No. 3

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)

Weather message from Tokyo station JWV3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

3 (d)
Secret

DOCUMENT No. 4

English

This is in the middle of the news but today, specially at this point I will give the weather forecast:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

This is in the middle of the news but today, at this point specially I will give the weather forecast:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

Romaji

Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga honjitsu wa toku ni koko de tenki yoho wo moshiage masu

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga kyo wa koko de toku ni tenki yoho wo moshiage masu

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

4 (a)

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., Room 4D761, the Pentagon, 3 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell:

Pursuant to your request the War Department directed General MacArthur's Headquarters to make inquiries in Japan concerning the Winds Code.

Attached are unparaphrased copies of the cables exchanged between the War Department and General MacArthur.

HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

Incl.

4 (c)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 6, 1945.

DEAR MR. MITCHELL: In compliance with your request of December 3, 1945, I enclose a paraphrase of our cable of November 6, 1945 to London, the Hague and Canberra inquiring about the "winds" message.

My letter of yesterday advised you of the answers we have received from London and the Hague.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Herbert S. Marks,
/t/ HERBERT S. MARKS,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosure:

Paraphrased cable.
The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel,*
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

30 OCTOBER 1945.

GSB 168

From: War Department

To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo

On 19 Nov 1941 Japanese Foreign Office advised its representatives abroad that in case diplomatic relations with United States, Great Britain or Russia were about to be severed a certain signal in form of false weather report would be broadcast in news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. Signal was to be "Higashi No Kaze Ame" (east wind rain) in case of break between Japan and United States, "Kitano Kaze Kumori" (north wind cloudy) in case of break between Japan and Russia and "Nishi No Kaze Hare" (west wind clear) in case of break between Japan and Great Britain. Congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor attack has requested that Japanese records and authorities be examined to ascertain whether any signal implementing this or any similar code was in fact transmitted on or prior to 7 Dec and if so exact time and manner or transmittal. Inconclusive evidence available here suggests such signal may have been transmitted on or about 4 Dec. Request that all reasonable steps be taken to obtain such information and that this request and resulting information receive no publicity.

3 NOVEMBER 1945.

BSG 187

From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo

To: War Department

GSB 168 dated 31 Oct investigation has been initiated and results thereof will be communicated at the earliest practicable date. Progress in work of this kind is of necessity somewhat slow. However, every effort will be made to expedite it. Necessary steps have been taken to avoid publicity.

GSB 180

6 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: War Department.

To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo.

Supplementing GSB 168 there follows full Japanese text of two circulars from Tokyo Foreign Office dated 19 Nov 1941:

Circular 2353. Kanchoo fugoo atsukai kokusai jigyou no hippaku no kekka itsu saikaku no jitai ni taichi itaru kamo hakararezaru tokoro kakaru baai wagahoo to aitekoku tonu tsunshin wa tadachi ni teishi serarubeki wo motte wagahoo no gaikoo kankai kiken ni hinsuru baai ni wa waga kaigai

hoosoo no kakuchj muke nihohoo news no chuukan oyobi saigo ni oite tenki yohoo to shite. 1. Nichibeī kankei no baai ni wa "higashi no kaze ame". 2. Nichiso kankei no baai ni wa "kita no kaze kumori". 3. Nichiei kankei no baai ("tai" shinchuu "maree" Netherlands E. I. kooryoku oboe fukumu ("nishi no kaze hare". 02 do zutsu kurikaeshi hoosoo seshimeru koto to seru wo motte migi ni yori angoo, shorui too tekitoo shobun aritashi. Nao migi wa gen ni gokuhi atsukai to seraretashi.

Circular 2354: Gokuhi. Wagahoo no galkoo kankai kiken ni hinsen to suru baai ni wa ippah joohoo hoosoo no bootoo oyobi matsubi ni: 1. Nichibeī kankei hippaku no baai ni wa "higashi". 2. Nichiso kankei no baai ni wa "kita". 3. Nichiei kankei ("tai" shin chuu "maree" Netherlands E. I. kooryoku oboe fukumu (no baai ni wa "nishi". Narugo 05 do ate soonyuu subeki ni tsuki goryoochi aritashi.

Both messages sent in _____¹ Believe broadcasts mentioned for signalling in circular 2353 were voice broadcasts and those in 2354 were Morse code.

¹ Code designation omitted.

BSG 196

13 NOVEMBER 1945.

From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.
To: War Department.

Reference message 1 November requiring search of Jap records and interrogation of authorities to ascertain whether an implementing signal to circulars 2353 and 2354 (see GSB 180) Tokyo Foreign Office 19 November 1941 was ever transmitted. Investigation discloses that all pertinent records were burned prior to emperor's rescript of 14 August 1945. Interrogation of authorities so far has resulted in absolute denial of transmission of such an implementing message and existence of any prearranged instructions which would permit transmission of such an implementing signal. It would help the investigation if pertinent authorities could be confronted with circulars 2353 and 2354. This has not been done before in order to avoid disclosing to the Japanese the fact that we had this info. Investigation will be continued but without much prospect of success unless appropriate authorities can be confronted with circulars mentioned.

GSB 186

13 NOVEMBER 1945.

From: War Department.
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.

Reference BSG 196 you are authorized to confront Japanese officials with copies of circulars 2353 and 2354 but without disclosing when or by what means they were obtained.

21 NOVEMBER 1945.

BSG 210

From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.
To: War Department

In reply to radiogram 31 October 1945, GSB-168, the results of interrogation of number of employees have indicated that signal implementing circular 2353 and 2354, was probably not transmitted prior to 8 December, Tokyo time, but was transmitted by radio voice broadcast at some hour after 0230, 8 December, Tokyo time. Exact hour unknown. No evidence can be obtained that implementing signal was transmitted by radio telegraph. 1 employee, now in Tokyo, states that he received radio voice broadcast signal in Rangoon at 0930, 8 December, Tokyo time (0630 Rangoon time). No info has been obtained that any signal implementing similar code was transmitted.

As stated in my message number BSG-196, the burning of pertinent records prior to Emperor's rescript of 14 August 1945 precluded obtaining info on this subject from that source.

Furthermore, individuals who were in authority at time under consideration admitted nothing until they were confronted with circulars 2353 and 2354 of Tokyo Foreign Office, 19 November 1941, pursuant to authority contained in your GSB-186.

These employees did not learn when or by what means these circulars were obtained.

Further investigation here appears unprofitable. Request authority to discontinue it.

24 NOVEMBER 1945.

GSB 196

From: War Department

To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo

Reference BSG 210. Only use of Winds code (either voice or radio telegraph) shown here by available contemporaneous records is voice broadcast from Tokyo between 0902 and 0935 on 8 December Tokyo time using code words referring to British Japanese relations. In order to assist in evaluating information given in your BSG 210, Joint Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee desires to know first whether persons who conducted interrogation or those who were interrogated had any knowledge that prior to the interrogation of the United States had information establishing use of Winds code on 8 December Tokyo time, and, secondly, if such persons did have such knowledge, whether they knew that the United States had no definite information establishing use of Winds code at any time prior to 8 December Tokyo time. Prompt reply will be appreciated.

27 NOVEMBER 1945.

BSG 214

From: Commander-in-Chief Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo

To: War Department

Reur GSB-196 persons who conducted interrogation had no knowledge that prior to interrogation United States had info establishing use of Winds code on 8 Dec Tokyo time. Persons who were interrogated were not asked whether they knew that United States had info establishing use of Winds code on 8 Dec Tokyo time. Also, interrogated persons were not asked whether they knew that United States had no info establishing use of the Winds code at any time prior to 8 Dec Tokyo time. They will be questioned on these points at once and answers provided. Employee referred to in my BSG-210 who stated that he received voice broadcast signaling Rangoon at 0930, 8 Dec Tokyo time (0630 Rangoon time) may have meant that he received code words referring to British-Jap relations. He will be questioned again. This partial reply is made now and full reply will be forwarded as promptly as employees can again be found for questioning.

27 NOVEMBER 1945.

GSB 197

From: War Department

To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo.

Information supplied in BSG 214 is believed sufficient answer to Committee's question, which was directed towards prior knowledge of interrogators and whether anything had developed in the interrogation which would indicate such prior knowledge on the part of Japanese. It seems clear from your BSG 214 that there was no such indication. Please confirm this.

It is requested that no further interrogation on this point be conducted unless Congressional Committee indicates desire to press inquiry further, in which event you will be advised.

Further interrogation of employee referred to in BSG 210 to ascertain whether broadcast heard in Rangoon used code words referring only to British-Japanese relations would be helpful. Other wise you may consider interrogation completed.

30 NOVEMBER 1945.

BSG 219

From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo

To: War Department

Reur GSB 197 nothing developed during interrogation which indicated on part of Japanese prior knowledge of character stated in your GSB 197.

Employee who heard Rangoon broadcast states he does not recall code words heard but believes they referred to severance of British-Jap relations. This resulted from further questioning of this employee and without prompting as to character of answer given.

U. S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION TO JAPAN

Interrogation No. 11.

Place: FLTLOSCAP

Date: 30 November 1945

Subject: Radio Tokyo Broadcast December 8.

Personnel Interrogated: Mr. Shinroku Tanomogi, Head of Overseas Department of Japan Radio Broadcasting Corporation in December 1941; presently member of the Diet and secretary to the Minister of Transportation.

Interrogator: Captain Peyton Harrison, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. (jg) Stanley E. Sprague, USNR.

Summary:

Mr. Tanomogi, as head of the Overseas Department, was in charge of programs, including news programs, beamed to foreign countries. All news releases were controlled or "censored" by the Information Bureau of the Cabinet, the Communications Bureau of the Communications Ministry, and the General Staff.

Mr. Tanomogi was usually on duty at Radio Tokyo every other night. He was on duty the night of December 7 (Tokyo Time) and stated that the regular schedule of programs was broadcast. At about 0400 on December 8, he received a telephone call from the Information Bureau informing him that Japan was at war and that scheduled programs would have to be rearranged and preparations made for broadcasting important government communiques. An official of the Information Bureau arrived at Radio Tokyo early on the morning of December 8 to work out details with Tanomogi's staff. Tanomogi remained at Radio Tokyo until about 1800 of December 8. He stated that they broadcast only what was given them by Domei News or by the Information Bureau. "All news was official government news".

Mr. Tanomogi was asked if he remembered the "east wind rain" weather report broadcast about 1500 on December 8. He replied that he was not listening to the broadcasts at that particular hour, but that he had a vague recollection of some such announcement being broadcast among the releases abruptly ordered for transmission that day by the Information Bureau.

Mr. Tanomogi was handed a copy of Drew Pearson's article in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of November 9, 1945. He stated that he would have known of it if a message such as that described as being broadcast December 4 had been transmitted and that he had no recollection at all of any "east wind rain" report or any similar phrase being broadcast prior to December 8.

 PARAPHRASE OF INCOMING TELEGRAM

To: London, the Hague and Canberra, November 6, 1945.

From: Secretary Byrnes

The Congressional Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack has sent to the Department a communication of which the essential portion is quoted below:

"Under date of November 19, 1941, Japan advised its representatives abroad that if danger arose of a breach of diplomatic relations with the United States, or Russia or the British, and the cutting off of other means of international communications, an emergency system for warning Japanese diplomatic representatives of impending break in diplomatic relations would be used, by adding in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast the following:

"(1) In case Japan-United States relations were in danger, the words Higashi No Kazeame (East Wind Rain).

"(2) In case of Japan-Russian relations in danger, the words Kitanokaze Kumori (North Wind Cloudy).

"(3) In case Japan-British relations in danger, the words Nishi No Kaze Hare (West Wind Clear).

this signal to be given in the middle and at the end of the broadcast as a weather forecast, 'each sentence to be repeated twice'. This arrangement also said, 'When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc.'

"At the same time, on November 19, 1941, the Japanese sent further notice to its representatives that when their diplomatic relations with the United States, Russia or the British were in danger, there would be added at the beginning and at the end of Japanese general intelligence broadcasts words as follows:

"(1) If it were Japan-United States relations, the word 'Higashi'.

"(2) If it were Japan-Russia relations, the word 'Kita'.

"(3) If it were Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and Nei), the word 'Nishi'.

These words to be repeated five times at the beginning and end of the broadcast.

"The Joint Congressional Committee Investigating the Attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941 are trying to ascertain whether any broadcast under this system were monitored and overheard, either by the United States or by Australia, the Dutch East Indies or the British, and, if so, on what day and at what time such a broadcast was overheard, and if so the text of the broadcast, and whether either of the three nations mentioned, having overheard the broadcast, advised the United States of the fact. We are particularly interested in the period from November 27th to December 7th inclusive, and suggest that the inquiry first cover that period and then, if time permits, work back to November 19, 1941."

You are requested urgently to inquire of the government to which you are accredited concerning the above and at the earliest possible moment to telegraph a report of the results.

4 (d)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 29, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I am enclosing as requested by your office a paraphrase of the cable from Canberra which was referred to in my letter of November 26.

Sincerely yours,

(S) Herbert S. Marks

(T) HERBERT S. MARKS.

Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosure: Paraphrase of cable from Canberra.

The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel,*
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack.
Congress of the United States.

Paraphrased copy

CANBERRA, November 16, 1945.

SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington,
168, November 16, 3 p. m.

Nothing has been revealed by an exhaustive search of the records of the monitoring service according to the Department of External Affairs. It is stated however that they may have missed certain messages in code as at that time trends only were followed and Japanese broadcasts were not taken down verbatim by the monitoring service.

MINTER.

4 (e)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 5, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I enclose a paraphrased cable dated December 4, 1945, just received from London in reply to our inquiry of November 6 as to whether the British had monitored and overheard any Japanese broadcasts using the so-called "winds" code between November 19 and December 7, 1941.

As to the Netherlands, the Counselor of the American Embassy at The Hague advised us by telephone this morning that the Dutch Foreign Office has now stated in reply to our inquiry of November 6, that the most careful search has had negative results.

Sincerely yours,

(S) Herbert S. Marks
(T) HERBERT S. MARKS,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosure: Paraphrased cable.

The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel,*
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

PARAPHRASING OF INCOMING TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, December 4, 1945

From: American Ambassador, London

The Foreign Office has just informed us that while their inquiries are not yet finished, up to the present no evidence has been found that any "wind" message was received before the morning of December 8, 1941, the day following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Foreign Office says that there was relayed to Singapore from Hongkong a broadcast by the Japanese which contained messages in code and which was received in Singapore six hours following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The text of the Japanese code is not available yet but if desired we will ask the Foreign Office for more particulars.

The following messages appearing on the indicated pages of Committee Exhibit 1 deal with instructions sent in code via ordinary commercial channels of communication, to Japanese representatives to destroy their codes:

	<i>Committee Exhibit 1</i>
Circular 2436 of Dec. 1, 1941	p. 208
Circular 2443 of Dec. 1, 1941	p. 209
Circular 2444 of Dec. 1, 1941	p. 209
Circular 2445 of Dec. 1, 1941	p. 215
Tokyo to Washington, No. 867, of Dec. 2, 1941	p. 215
Circular 2447 of Dec. 2, 1941	p. 216
Tokyo to Washington, No. 881, of Dec. 4, 1941	p. 231
Washington to Tokyo, No. 1268 of Dec. 5, 1941	p. 236
Panama to Tokyo, No. 367, of Dec. 5, 1941	p. 237
Tokyo to Washington, No. 897 of Dec. 6, 1941	p. 237
Bangkok to Tokyo, No. 919, of Dec. 6, 1941	p. 247
Tokyo to Washington, No. 910, of Dec. 7, 1941	p. 249

Enclosure (A)

6 (A)

Top Secret—Ultra

8 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subj: JD-1: 7001, special studies concerning

1. In an effort to locate JD-1: 7001 the following sources have been exhaustively studied:

- a. numerical file of JD-1 #'s.
- b. chronological file of Japanese Diplomatic translations.
- c. the "Japanese diplomatic traffic log" for 1941.
- d. old GZ card index of Japanese diplomatic traffic, under Tokyo circulars and Tokyo-Washington circuit.

2. A special study of Jd-1 #'s was made to determine the relationship between the date of the message, the date of translation of the message, and the JD-1 #. The results of this study are attached to this memo.

3. From this study it would appear that JD-1: 7001, if such number was assigned to a translation, was for a message dated 28 November 1941, translated on either 12-2-41 or 12-3-41 by the Army. As all of the JD-1 #'s on both sides of JD-1: 7001 were translated on either 2 December 1941 it seems reasonably certain that the message was dated on or prior to 3 December 1941.

4. Throughout the JD-1 numerical file there are incidents of cancelled numbers. The reasons for some of these cancellations are not given; others are given as follows: "duplicate of message previously numbered", "additional part of message already assigned a number", and "number skipped by mistake".

5. In October 1944 and on 14 May 1945 Lieut. Comdr. G. E. Boone called Col. Rowlett at Arlington Hall and secured from him the following information concerning the Army numbering system in 1941: Occasionally numbers were cancelled, but there was no indication given of the reason for the cancellation, by whom it was made, nor by whom it was authorized. He stated that there were other cases of numbers cancelled in the 1941 file.

/s/ Sally T. Lightle,
/t/ SALLY T. LIGHTLE,
Lieut., USNR.

Enclosure with Op-20-G Top Secret—Ultra Serial 00036(20)

Study of JD-1 #'s to determine relationship between date of message, date of translation, and JD-1 #

JD-1#	Date of message	Date of translation	Army or Navy trans.	JD-1#	Date of message	Date of translation	Army or Navy trans.
6975	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	III 7022	2 Oct 1941	12-4-41	A
6976	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7023	2 Oct 1941	12-4-41	A
6977	29 Nov 1941	12-1-41	N	7024	20 Oct 1941	12-4-41	A
6978	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7025	25 Oct 1941	12-3-41	N
6979	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7026	7 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
6980	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7027	10 Nov 1941	12-4-41	A
6981	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7028	15 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
6982	30 Nov 1941	12-2-41	A	7029	20 Nov 1941	12-4-41	A
6983	1 Dec 1941	12-1-41	N	7030	21 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
6984	1 Dec 1941	12-1-41	N	7031	21 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
6985	27 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7032	24 Nov 1941	12-4-41	A
				7033	24 Nov 1941	12-4-41	A
				7034	25 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
6986	9 Oct 1941	12-3-41	N	7035	25 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
				7036	25 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
I 6987	11 Oct 1941	12-2-41	N	7037	29 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
6988	25 Oct 1941	12-3-41	N	7038	29 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
6989	12 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A	7039	29 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N
6990	12 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A	7040	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
6991	15 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N	7041	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
6992	15 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N			Pt. 1, 3	
6993	15 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7042	1 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
6994	15 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N			Pt. 2	
6995	18 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A			12-4-41	N
6996	20 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A	7043	1 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
6997	21 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7044	1 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
6998	22 Nov 1941	12-2-41	A	7045	1 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
6999	27 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7046	2 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
7000	28 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A	7047	2 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
7001				7048	3 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N
7002	28 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A	7049	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7003	28 Nov 1941	12-2-41	A	7050	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7004	28 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A	7051	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7005	28 Nov 1941	12-3-41	A	7052	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7006	29 Nov 1941	12-3-41	N	7053	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7007	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7054	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7008	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7055	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7009	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7056	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7010	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7057	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N
7011	29 Nov 1941	12-2-41	N	7058	2 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7012	1 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N	7059	2 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
7013	1 Dec 1941	12-2-41	N				
7014	2 Dec 1941	12-3-41	A				
7015	2 Dec 1941	12-3-41	A				
7016	3 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N	IV 7060	18 Oct 1941	12-5-41	A
7017	2 Dec 1941	12-3-41	A	7061	10 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
				7062	15 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N
				7063	18 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7018	3 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N	7064	18 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7019	3 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N	7065	18 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7020	3 Dec 1941	12-3-41	N				
7021	2 Dec 1941	12-3-41	A				

¹ Revision.

Study of JD-1 #'s to determine relationship between date of message, date of translation, and JD-1 #—Continued

JD-1#	Date of message	Date of translation	Army or Navy trans.	JD-1#	Date of message	Date of translation	Army or Navy trans.
7066	18 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7099	3 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7067	20 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7100	3 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7068	20 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7101	4 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
7069	22 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7102	4 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7070	24 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7103	4 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7071	25 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N	7104	4 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7072	25 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N	7105	4 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A
7073	25 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N	7106	4 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7074	25 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N	7107	4 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A
7075	25 Nov 1941	12-4-41	N	7108	4 Dec 1941	(no date given)	A
7076	26 Nov 1941	12-4-41	A				
7077	26 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7109	27 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N
7078	26 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N				
7079	27 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N				
7080	27 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N	V 7110	18 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7081	27 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N	7111	18 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7082	27 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N	7112	18 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7083	28 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7113	20 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7084	28 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7114	20 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7085	28 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7115	26 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7086	29 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N	7116	26 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7087	29 Nov 1941	12-5-41	N	7117	26 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7088	30 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7118	26 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A
7089	30 Nov 1941	12-5-41	A	7119	27 Nov 1941	12-6-41	N
7090	1 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N	7120	28 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7091	1 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N	7121	28 Nov 1941	12-6-41	A
7092	1 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N	7122	2 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N
7093	1 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N	7123	3 Dec 1941	12-6-41	N
7094	2 Dec 1941	12-4-41	A	7124	2 Dec 1941	12-7-41	A
7095	3 Dec 1941	12-5-41	A	7125	2 Dec 1941	12-6-41	A
7096	3 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N	7126	3 Dec 1941	12-7-41	A
7097	3 Dec 1941	12-4-41	N				
7098	3 Dec 1941	12-5-41	N				

6 (b)

Top Secret-Ultra

EXAMPLES OF JD-1 #'s CANCELLED AND JD-1: 6998-7004

INDEX

JD-1 #	Date	Circuit
911	Cancelled	
985	Cancelled	
1004	Cancelled	
2074	Cancelled	
4647	Cancelled	
6998	22 Nov 1941	Batavia-Tokyo.
6999	27 Nov 1941	Rome-Tokyo.
7000	28 Nov 1941	Tokyo-Hsinking.
7001	Cancelled	
7002	28 Nov 1941	Buenos Aires-Washington.
7003	28 Nov 1941	Rome-Tokyo.
7004	28 Nov 1941	Hsinking-Peking, Nanking and Shanghai.

Top Secret—Ultra
 (All handwritten:)
 Cancelled
 Dupl. of 957
 911 Cancelled

HSH 2/20/41

(All handwritten:)
 Top Secret—Ultra
 Number Cancelled

Part 3 of 3
 Bangkok-Tokyo=8 Feb. 1941 #92
 (See JD-1: 971)

985

Top Secret—Ultra
 (All handwritten:)
 Cancelled=
 Part 2 of 957
 1004=

HSH 2/20/41

(All handwritten)
 Top Secret—Ultra
 Number skipped in error (Cancel)
 2074

HSH

(All handwritten)
 Top Secret—Ultra
 Cancelled

Cancelled by Army after being numbered.
 4647

HSH

Secret
 Top Secret—Ultra
 From: Batavia (Isizawa)
 To: Tokyo
 November 22, 1941
 Purple.
 #1253.

To be handled in Government Code.

Departmental secret.

The activities of KOO CHOO SUI, backed up by the CHI GOO KAI and the KOO HOO (an intelligence society and a publication), is working hard in our behalf to stamp out anti-Japanism. Several incidents have occurred lately and his opponents are rather belligerent. Consequently, Governmental surveillance over KOO is rather close. From April to September of this year we afforded KOO a subsidy for the KOO HOO and a fund for collecting intelligence, amounting to from 2,000 to 3,000 guilders. KOO is so familiar with the Chinese and natives here that in case of emergency he can do much to help us. That is why I have employed him so far. He is ready at our direction to start the distribution of pamphlets designed to win over as many of his consanguinaries and the natives as possible. I think that we should continue to avail ourselves of his services. He has a family of eight. Therefore, I think we should let him have 3,000 guilders for operating expenses; 15,000 guilders for living expenses, and 12,000 guilders as a subsidy for the KOO HOO as of from October 1st to the end of the year. Will you please, therefore, arrange to appropriate and remit that amount, namely 30,000 guilders.

Army 25633 6998 Trans. 12-2-41 (6)

Top Secret—Ultra

From: Rome.

To: Tokyo.

27 November 1941

(Purple)

?

(1st section—undecodeable)

(2nd section)

Although supply movements are beset with difficulties, including occasional sinkings of convoys, these supplies are continuing and they are optimistic of the final outcome.¹ Furthermore * * * (Remainder of section 2 undecodeable)
(3rd section)

As regards Italian-French relations, up to now independent conversations between the French and Italians have not taken place. However, with the elimination of Weygand it is being said in various quarters that a great increase in use of Tunis army transportation facilities is contemplated.

JD-1: 690 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (G-Tf)

[1] Secret

Top Secret—Ultra

From: Tokyo

To: Hsinking

November 28, 1941.

Purple.

#782 (corrected to #882).

Re your #751.^a

1. We have been communicating with the German representatives here, giving them much of the Manchukuan opinions and, as a result of a talk between OTAKI and WCHLTHAT, the final draft for a new German-Manchukuan pact is proposed by Germany as follows:

(a) The title of the pact is "A provisional agreement for extending German-Manchukuoan economic Relations."

(b) This pact is effective until the last day of March next year.

(c) The balance of 85,000 tons of soy beans shall be delivered before the end of March at the old price although the agreement expires the end of January.

(d) 4,500 tons of soy bean oil, including the undelivered balance on the contract for jinson, shall also be delivered by the end of March.

(e) Exchange permits shall be given for the unused balance of German contingent goods specified in the pact of May 31, 1941. (Minister WAGNER must have a list of about one million marks' worth of goods in Japan, Manchukuo, Shanghai and other Far Eastern points.)

(f) Export permits shall be given for German goods which are now held or may in the future be held in Manchukuo at the convenience of the holders. If a state of emergency should arise, this goods shall not be confiscated nor seized. The above should be administered on a rational basis.

[2] (g) The application of this contract will be acted on by specified conferences of local tradesmen.

(h) The term for repayment of the "W" account shall be extended to May 31, 1942. However, this understanding shall be made directly with the bank at the same time the pact is set up; it will not be mentioned in the pact.

(i) 1,000,000 marks shall be appropriated at the end of November and December respectively and 1,500,000 marks at the end of January and February respectively from the "B" account for repayment of the "X" account. (Although their representatives have already expressed their wishes to WAGNER, when I talked with WAGNER on the 21st I did not mention this. As he believes it should be handled from special funds, I think it is best for Manchukua to negotiate for necessary funds on short term credit under this measure).

(j) Germany will offer credit to a maximum of 10,000,000 marks, because of the reduction in amount of shipments of Manchukuoan products (soy beans and soy bean oil). For this credit a new account, "V," will be set up. Thus, the

¹ In Libya.

"X" account should be liquidated during the term of the new pact through the 5,000,000 marks from account "B" and soy bean payments, and account "W" should be reduced by at least 1,000,000 marks from soy bean payments.

(k) The balance of account "B" shall be used for payments to Germany. Manchukuo is at liberty to make payments under heading (c) from any account whatsoever.

[3] (1) The second section and the second paragraph of the third section of the pact of May 31, 1941 (means for conversion of obligations not yet settled at the expiration of the pact) shall be left unchanged.

2. Although Manchukuo will probably want to pay Germany through regular channels, because of the obstacles to transportation I think it would be better to deduct German payments from (a) together with a suitable rate of interest. Moreover, believing that the terms of this pact are reasonable since Manchukuo's credit responsibilities are greatly increased, as soon as they get Manchukuo's approval Germany will send it to Berlin. As they wish to have it returned to Tokyo with the signatures of WCHLTHAT, SPINDLER and the Manchukuoan representatives not later than Christmas, they demand speedy consideration by Manchukuo.

Please press the Manchukuo government for prompt adoption of the above pact and please wire a reply. Since Japan and Germany are virtually in agreement on the Chinese text, please urge them again to let us know at once their opinion of the German-Manchukuoan understanding mentioned in our secret message #474^a dated September 27th (German edition: German text).

This telegram has been discussed with military authorities and Vice Minister MIURA.

Army 25631

Trans. 12-3-41 (5)

^a Not available.

Top Secret-Ultra

(Typed)

JD-1 : 7001

Number cancelled.

7001

Top Secret-Ultra

Secret

From : Buenos Aires (Tomii)

To : Washington

November 28, 1941

Purple

#17

We have received the consignment from your office. Please advise us the call letters and general news.

Army 7002

Trans. 12/3/41 (8)

Secret

Top Secret-Ultra

From : Rome

To : Tokyo

November 28, 1941.

Purple.

#766. (Primary importance)

According to reports received from the Vatican through CICOGNANI, the Papal representative in Washington, many indications are evident that Japan forms a great obstacle to the United States' early termination of the present anti-Axis war. Public opinion in the United States is that America would be able to achieve victory for Great Britain simply by large-scale production of military supplies if it were not for this obstacle. In the event of a Japanese-American clash, assistance to England and the Soviet would decrease, making necessary American military intervention by means of forces on the European continent. Moreover, there are a great many who believe that during American-Japanese negotiations Japan put forth stipulations encroaching upon American interests and honor and so causing conditions to become extremely delicate.

There were also reports to the effect that the difficulties of Japanese-American negotiations constrained the Interventionist faction headed by the President and strengthened the position of the Isolationists.

Army 7003 25630

Trans. 12-2-41 (MR)

[1] Secret
 Top Secret-Ultra
 From: Hsinking
 To: Peking, Nanking and Shanghai
 November 28, 1941
 Purple
 Cir. 231 (Message to Tokyo #779)

Local military intelligences are as follows. For you information.

1. At the military review in celebration of the anniversary of the revolution, 47 airplanes of an unrecognizable type flew over the city of Kuibyshev. They were definitely of American design and construction. It seems that large numbers have recently been arriving.

(The above is a report of the Japanese Military Attaché in the Soviet.)

2. Large bodies of anti-Communist mobile forces are fighting in the vicinity of Mininsk (Russe) and Barugujin^a (south of Krasnoyarsk), destroying lines of communication and attacking the Kolhoz and Sofhoz. (The above is a spy report.)

3. The 39th Sharpshooters Division (in the neighborhood of Kogaiko^a) has executed before the firing squad 20 unsuccessful deserters² who tried to get into Manchukuo between May and November. To date, 46 Soviet troops have deserted. The Soviet, in order to prevent desertion, has moved certain detachments away from the border or have strung charged barbed wire fences along the border. Another means which they are utilizing is making the regiment responsible for detachments from which there have been deserters. (The above is intelligence of primary importance.)

[2] 4. Recently to the Ude Front, the surveillance troops of the outer Mongolian area have within the last few days deliberately trespassed on Mongolian territory several times, even to the extent of 10 to 20 kilos. They are taking a strong, hostile attitude toward Japanese surveillance troops. (The above is intelligence of primary importance.)

I have transmitted this to Peitai, Shanghai, and Nandai.

Army 25632 Trans. 12/3/41 (5)

^a Kana spelling.

EXHIBIT NO. 142A

DEC. 5, 1941.

Mr. WELLS: At 7:45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the following information:

JVW 21500

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (The above was repeated three times)

JVW sent a time signal at 2200G and then:

I WILL NOW GIVE YOU THE WEATHER REPORT (nothing further, carrier on but no modulation evidently cut off in Tokyo).

Remarks by Carter: They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is evident that at 2100G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five percent.

Colonel Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7:50 p. m.

Remarks by Col. Bratton: Results still negative but am pleased to receive the tentative results as it means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked Col. Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland—concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenberg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.